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‘Voice of Civilisation: advertising and its critics in austerity Britain’ 
 
Recent historians of wartime Britain and the Attlee years have taught us a great deal about 
the fundamental role played by popular consumption during this crucial period. 
Consumption issues were brought to the fore during the Second World War and they 
continued to be vital in its aftermath. Most obviously, personal consumption was severely 
restrained, by 15% for foodstuffs in 1942, more than 30% for clothing, probably 75% for 
household goods, cutbacks that represented the largest reduction in personal consumption 
in modern British history. Brand names largely disappeared to be replaced by standardised 
goods produced through ‘pooling’ arrangements with manufacturers. Government policy of 
‘Fair Shares For All’ and ‘Make do and Mend’ promulgated by the Ministry of Food and the 
Ministry of Information legitimised a ‘moral economy’ of consumption from above.
1
 Despite 
the inevitable evasions and negotiations, these priorities it seems were broadly supported 
by the majority of the British people, as Mark Roodhouse’s work on rationing and the black 
market has convincingly demonstrated.
2
 
 In this context, commercial advertising – which had enjoyed a golden age during the 
interwar period when the industry attempted to boost its public standing by means of 
formal professional bodies and large-scale exhibitions
3
 – was placed firmly on the defensive. 
Advertising continued of course, funded by government to publicise various campaigns and 
by manufacturers who recognised the importance of maintaining consumer goodwill for 
branded goods that had taken years to build up. Nevertheless, its influence was severely 
curtailed and it was feared that it was increasingly regarded by the public as at best 
wasteful, at worst downright unpatriotic.
4
 Research by David Camplin and Philippa 
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Haughton has shown how the advertising industry coped with these pressures by proving 
their usefulness to government during the national emergency. Professional groups such as 
the Advertising Association and the Incorporated Institute of Practitioners in Advertising 
worked hard to build links with the Ministry of Information and other government 
departments with a view to help maintain morale on the home front.
5
 However, such 
initiatives were frequently undermined by commercial self-interest, which fuelled popular 
mistrust; Excess Profits Tax that was introduced in September 1939, for example, and which 
froze profits at pre-war levels, was often evaded by manufacturers who preferred to spend 
profits on advertising goods that were in short supply or even unavailable rather than give 
more money to the Treasury. Moreover, advertising campaigns that cynically used the 
experience of war for private gain unsurprisingly generated opprobrium. Mass-Observation 
reported in September 1940 that an advertisement for Aspro, which claimed the product 
had helped save soldiers’ lives at Dunkirk, was thought particularly distasteful, one air raid 
warden in his mid-30s condemning it as, ‘Bloody disgusting. I don’t think Aspro should ever 
have put it in. Our troops fighting on Aspro…It says a lot for this nation if Aspro saved 
Dunkirk...It’s bloody disgusting.’
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 Published in 1943, Denys Thompson’s ironically titled book Voice of Civilisation was a 
forthright expression of the critique of advertising that flourished during wartime. In it, 
Thompson raised the possibility of the complete elimination of what he regarded as an 
unnecessary and often deceitful stimulus, remarking; ‘advertising as we know it may be 
dispensed with after the war. We are getting on very well with a greatly diminished volume 
of commercial advertising in war time, and it is difficult to envisage a return of the 1919-39 
conditions in which publicity proliferated.’
6
 Tapping into the uncritical pro-Sovietism that 
was widespread at the time, Thompson went on to praise the U.S.S.R. as ‘a country which 
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adopts twentieth-century manufacturing technique without twentieth-century sales talk’, 
and where he believed production for use rather than profit had been successfully 
established.
7
 In this new economy and society he argued, the desire for superfluous luxuries 
had died out and with it the largely irrational psychological appeals of commercial 
advertising, to be replaced by rational public information. Thompson thought Britain had 
moved closer to this model during the war as brands had been mostly abolished and the 
Pharmacy and Medicines Bill of 1941 had rendered illegal the most misleading claims made 
by advertisers of patent or ‘quack’ medicines. The headmaster of Yeovil Grammar School, 
Thompson’s mentor before the war had been the literary and cultural critic F. R. Leavis (they 
published Culture and Environment together in 1933), and though he could still be 
patronising about the gullibility of ‘the masses’, he had moved much further to the left 
during the war under the influence of the exiled political sociologist Karl Mannheim, whose 
work sought to provide a philosophical and historical explanation for the inevitable triumph 
of ‘planning’ over the anarchy of laissez faire capitalism.
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 Thompson also feared that 
advertising, as the vanguard of the commercial domain, was colonising politics more 
thoroughly than ever before, with ominous results. Nazi Germany was only the logical 
outcome of a situation where people had not been taught how to think for themselves and 
where, ‘Political discussion is carried on at the advertising level.’
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 Thompson’s view seems rather extreme in hindsight but it was not that unusual at 
the time. Advertising was assailed from many quarters; a Presbyterian minister in 
Sunderland, the Reverend Wigham Price, even preaching to his flock just after the war 
about the evils of the modern advertising ‘racket’, which he described as nothing less than a 
form of ‘Commercial Gangsterdom’.
10
 Scholars have frequently drawn attention to the 
attack on advertising and consumer culture in the late 1950s launched by Leavisites like 
4 
 
Richard Hoggart on this side of the Atlantic and economists and writers such as J. K. 
Galbraith and Vance Packard in the United States, as well as those intellectuals influenced 
by Marxist theorists such as Herbert Marcuse that grouped together to form the New Left.
11
 
However, it is important also to take a wider and longer perspective, for the critique of 
advertising and consumer culture had deep indigenous roots in the British labour 
movement, drawing on various ideological sources, including the writings of John Ruskin, 
William Morris and J. A. Hobson, as well as an immensely rich tradition of associational 
practice, most importantly nonconformist religious organisations and the Co-operative 
movement.
12
 This article argues that war and the growing popularity of ‘planning’ in broad 
(and often vague) terms served to knit together and focus the various component parts of 
this critique, which reached a kind of high-water mark under the period of the first  Attlee 
government. 
  Advertisers themselves acknowledged the difficulties they faced at the end of the 
war, and not only from preachers, intellectuals and the labour movement. It was hardly 
surprising that the editor of Advertiser’s Weekly should dismiss Thompson’s book as 
nonsense, no more than a ‘fanatical tirade’; or that they should condemn a later 
intervention by the same writer – dismissively labelled ‘the pedagogue’ – as nothing more 
than ‘the prejudiced outpouring of a man whose life is spent in the petty kingdom of the 
schoolroom.’ Nevertheless, the periodical also admitted that the most urgent task facing the 
industry was to bring about its ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘restore faith in advertising’. The problem 
was that Thompson’s negative assessment resonated widely and as the editor concluded, 
‘We have to deal with what the voter thinks advertising is up to...Time is running short’.
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Early in 1947 John Nicholas, managing director of the advertising agency Rumble, Crowther 
and Nicholas, advised that ‘they must destroy the popular jibe that had fastened the word 
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“racket” upon them; they might even persuade the BBC to take advertising out of the 
mouths of the prigs of culture and allow responsible advertising men to tell the public what 
advertising really meant, and how it worked.’
14
 Two years later Mass-Observation 
conducted a study of press readership. Most people interviewed said that they were not 
interested in advertisements and this attitude was even more pronounced amongst readers 
of working-class dailies. To cheer up the sponsors of the study (the Advertising Service 
Guild), Mass-Observation pointed to what they regarded as a contradiction between 
conscious and unconscious influence, for regardless of their stated views, the majority could 
recall brand names when asked.
15
 Nevertheless, it was significant surely that interviewees 
choose to distance themselves from advertisements. 
 Surprisingly, given the recent interest in the politics of consumption among 
historians of this period, the relationship between the advertising industry and government 
remains relatively understudied.
16
 Yet the heated debate on advertising during the war and 
in its immediate aftermath helps illuminate the wider struggle taking place between 
‘planning’ and ‘free enterprise’ at this crucial juncture in modern British history. Drawing on 
the advertising press, particularly the most important trade publication at the time, 
Advertisers’ Weekly, this article represents an analysis of what was at stake in that debate. It 
is divided into three main parts. First, the contradictory situation that faced the advertising 
industry at the end of the war is briefly discussed. I then go on to consider how advertisers 
tried to conciliate government and build alliances against their political enemies. The crisis 
of late 1947, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, and his successor Sir 
Stafford Cripps following Dalton’s unexpected resignation, threatened to levy a punitive tax 
on advertising, provides the major focus for the article. The final section discusses the 
aftermath of this struggle and reflects on its significance. 
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Challenges and opportunities 
The advertising industry may have been highly defensive at the end of the war but it was 
also dynamic and progressive, eager to face the challenges that it confronted. The 
advertising press worked hard to balance a realistic appreciation of the changed situation 
with hope for expansion. Government plans for nationalisation generated specific anxieties, 
while more generally it was feared that opponents of advertising in the Labour Party (and 
there were many), would force through punitive measures. Although the industry still had 
strong support in parliament, the four candidates with a background in advertising that 
stood for election in 1945 were all unsuccessful.
17
 Figures for expenditure on advertising did 
not provide any comfort either, as they demonstrated that the industry was stagnating or 
worse. Government was the largest advertiser at the end of the war and total expenditure 
figures for press advertising for 1945 were slightly down on those for the previous year; 
£14,547,268 compared to £14, 593,692, due to cut backs in government advertising. Indeed, 
although the situation improved gradually, total expenditure on advertising did not recover 
to pre-war levels until 1949.
18
 
 Against this challenging background, Advertiser’s Weekly. The Organ of British 
Advertising provided guidance and encouragement for those employed in the advertising 
industry. It was owned and edited by an ebullient American business journalist, T. J. 
Zimmerman, who had moved to London and purchased the periodical just after the First 
World War. Zimmerman transformed the paper into the most imaginative trade publication 
in the field, pushing aside the monthly Advertising World and building a substantial 
publishing house that eventually comprised twenty-two titles. Circulation rose steadily from 
about 25,000 copies a month in the late 1930s to over 40,000 a decade later, a highly 
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respectable figure for a trade paper, copies of which would have been passed round in 
offices and read by many employees.
19
 It sought to represent and speak for the various 
groups that comprised the industry, including the advertisers who funded campaigns for 
their goods, advertising agents that designed and orchestrated campaigns, artists and 
printers that did much of the creative work, and the owners of media in which 
advertisements appeared, most importantly the press. Not infrequently, these groups 
pulled in different directions, were divided between and among themselves. During the war 
and the Attlee years, for instance, agencies were split between the few large firms that 
managed to win government contracts from the Ministry of Information and later the 
Central Office of Information (including Bensons, London Press Exchange, and Mather & 
Crowther), and those smaller firms that were shut out.
20
 Advertiser’s Weekly generally 
managed to skilfully harmonise these competing voices to create the appearance at least of 
a largely unified industry with shared interests. Moreover, that fact that Zimmerman had 
experienced the way in which the British state had encroached on advertising during an 
earlier total war was no doubt invaluable, enabling him to take a calmer view.
21
 
 Thus, the continuing importance of government for the advertising industry was 
recognised at the end of the war by Advertiser’s Weekly, which noted in August 1945 that 
some advertisers believed ‘that Socialism will be the biggest advertiser under the new 
regime’, though the paper went on to point out that this was likely to undermine agencies 
as expenditure would most probably be orchestrated by departments and nationalisation 
would have adverse effects on advertising for transport and industry.
22
 The dangers of state 
control of advertising were frequently underlined by leading figures in the industry, by the 
Director of the Advertising Association, J. L. Henderson, for example, at a meeting of the 
Glasgow Publicity Club, who also noted widespread ‘public scepticism’ concerning 
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advertising.
23
 Guided by Zimmerman, however, the paper tried to make the best of things, 
publishing the views of advertising men who stressed that it was ‘business as usual’. The 
editor impatiently called for advertisers to ‘Snap out of it’, to put negative thoughts to one 
side and adjust to the changed situation. These were ‘dog days’ for advertising, certainly, 
but there was no excuse for the defeatism that had spread throughout much of the 
industry: ‘in a profession which specialises in shouting from the housetops we never found 
so many tongue-tied barkers, so many shy extraverts, so many bashful showmen nor so 
much whispering in dark places.’ Agents ought to take the lead the editor advised, after all, 
it was they who had developed modern techniques of market research that had an 
invaluable role to play in state planning. Noting that electors had diverse motives for voting 
Labour the editor concluded, ‘Whatever else the country’s decision at the polls means it 
means a vote for a planned economy.’ There was no need, however, to over-react; ‘The 
Labour Party, contrary to popular belief, is not really a Socialist party’ and was pledged to 
work in the interests of both the working and middle classes. The need for the industry to 
adapt was underlined, then, but Zimmerman was also keen to reassure readers that, ‘This is 
not the end of free enterprise in advertising.’
24
 
 The situation on the other side of the Atlantic – where advertising had successfully 
bounced back – was repeatedly pointed to as a beacon of hope. Writing on the theme of 
‘Advertising in a Planned Economy’, a special correspondent for the paper asserted that 
people in Britain would also eventually demand ‘freedom of choice and ease of availability, 
rather than pay a large sum in taxes for State-controlled commodities, of limited range, 
backed by a hoard of inspecting and preventive officials.’ The idea that the situation in 
Britain, however adverse, was temporary and that eventually free market capitalism would 
inevitably reassert itself, was a running if usually subordinated theme in the immediate 
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post-war period, as indeed it had been during the war.
25
 Many were far less sanguine, 
however, and even the most optimistic commentators had to acknowledge that a 
renaissance was highly unlikely in the immediate future. The President of the Institute of 
Practitioners in Advertising, Hugh Appleton, attended the Annual Convention of the 
American Association of Advertising Agencies in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, in 
April 1949 and although Appleton put a positive gloss on the prospects ahead he admitted 
that the British were ‘as a people, far less Advertising-conscious than you are.’
26
 Back home 
enemies seemed to be everywhere; the BBC even broadcast an attack on the industry by an 
insider, Roger Falk, who was accused by advertising agents of representing them as ‘a cross 
between an American wise-cracking salesman and an English market-place huckster.’
27
 
 Advertisers were naturally very concerned about economic growth and the 
development of new markets globally. Advertiser’s Weekly consequently published detailed 
monthly reports on the prospects for the industry in numerous countries from the end of 
the war, including ex-colonies such as India but also in many other spheres of interest such 
as the Middle East, South Africa, South America, the Far East and China, mapping markets, 
existing media and varied social and political contexts for its readers.
28
 Historians of 
advertising have recently stressed how it is mistaken to regard British advertising agencies 
as inexorably eclipsed by their US rivals between the wars; they opened many offices 
overseas and grasped opportunities made possible by empire.
29
 The US was regarded as the 
major competitor for trade in these markets, though in India, for example, demand for 
British brand name goods would remain buoyant, it was hoped, and the failure of American 
soap to push out British brands before the war supported this optimistic view.
30
 Having won 
the war as allies, the US and Britain were now regarded as fighting the battle for trade, with 
advertisers portraying themselves as in the front line of this conflict. The advertising press 
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combined this global vision with regular detailed analysis of regional economies in the UK 
and the future business possibilities they represented. Plans to rebuild city centres 
destroyed by the Luftwaffe in places like Plymouth and turn them into modern shopping 
wonderlands were reported enthusiastically, one writer observing that by such means ‘New 
Consumers are Being Assembled’.
31
 Consumer demand that had been pent-up for so long 
during the war – one writer estimated small savers in Yorkshire alone had accumulated 
£390 million – would be satisfied in shopping cities like Leeds, where over 700,000 people 
had attended a ‘Homes of Tomorrow’ exhibition organised by the Yorkshire Evening Post 
during August and September in 1945.
32
 If the context was hostile in many respects the 
outlook was by no means totally gloomy. 
 
Conciliation 
The advertising industry initially adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Labour 
government and the policy of austerity and there was widespread recognition that it had to 
work within and adapt to the new environment. Complaints were constantly made, 
however, prompted by constraints caused by paper rationing, limits on space devoted to 
advertising in newspapers and firms’ shrinking budgets. Controls were strictly enforced; 
fines of £2,350 were imposed on Croydon Advertiser Ltd, for example, when the Ministry of 
Supply took action against the firm for giving too much space to advertising in its local 
papers.
33
 And signs were that things could get worse. The Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan 
– who famously described advertising during the debate over the introduction of 
commercial television in 1953 as ‘one of the most evil consequences of a society which is, 
itself, intrinsically evil’ – threatened to tighten further the legislation on patent medicines in 
1946, forcing the Advertising Association to produce a tougher revised code.
34
 A Royal 
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Commission on the Press was set up the following year, critics in the Labour Party like 
Michael Foot, a leading light in the Keep Left Group established at this time, but also others 
such as Tom Driburg and Douglas Jay hoping that it would expose the pernicious influence 
exerted by advertisers who they believed held the so-called free press in thrall.
35
 
Interestingly, before the war Jay had been in favour of allowing the maximum freedom of 
choice for consumers (and hence a free rein for advertising), but had come to embrace 
‘planning’ and the subordination of commercial advertising which the idea entailed.
36
 The 
Royal Commission eventually published its report in 1949 that downplayed overt influence, 
much to advertisers’ relief, but until then the investigation and the threat of government 
intervention deeply coloured advertisers’ attitudes. Pressure on the industry increased as 
the country’s economic position deteriorated still further in 1947; newspapers had to 
reduce their size by a page from that summer or cut sales, and advertising agents faced 
substantial increases in rates, less frequent insertions and further reductions in space.
37
 
 For its part, the Labour government needed advertisers to help sell austerity and 
plans for a welfare state to the people, which was why it became the biggest single 
advertiser after the war. ‘Informational’ advertising, including press and poster campaigns 
and documentary films about food safety, the need to increase industrial productivity and 
reduce waste as well as many other subjects, was therefore discussed extensively in the 
advertising press.
38
 The Ministry of Food’s ‘crusade’ against bread waste was designed to 
educate consumers about the world food shortage and included ‘Battle for Bread’ 
exhibitions in 140 towns. The campaign was directed by the Ministry but it also involved 
leading agencies such as Mather & Crowther and J. Walter Thompson.
39
 The editor of 
Advertisers’ Weekly often pointed to such activity as proof of the usefulness of the industry 
against its most vocal critics. But fears remained as many believed that influential Labour 
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politicians and intellectuals who forged policy were implacably opposed to advertising, 
which they regarded as ‘the very head and front of the system of free enterprise’ and that if 
Labour got a second term ‘a mortal blow may be struck’.
40
 Some advertising men thought 
that the paper went too far in its efforts to placate opponents and the editor was forced to 
defend the conciliatory line, which Zimmerman did in no uncertain terms.
41
 
 Government was also grateful for help in its export drive, vital for Britain’s economic 
recovery after Lend Lease was abruptly terminated by the Truman administration. Thus, the 
President of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, supported the British Export Trade 
Research Organisation (BETRO) and the British Export Trade Advertising Corporation 
(BETAC), which were established early in 1946 by a number of industrialists and advertising 
executives to provide market research and advertising services for exporters.
42
 BETAC 
operated in 41 countries and was headed by Sinclair Wood, a director of Pritchard, Wood & 
Partners. Cripps attended a luncheon organised by this body in March 1946 as chief guest 
and, eager to boost exports, addressed the meeting in supportive tones, although he was 
careful to recommend the importance of ‘advertising publicity done in a really first-class 
way’, and stressed that publicity ought to be part of a much wider ‘sales relation service.’
43
 
In a speech to BETRO the year after, Cripps promised government subsidy for the initiative, 
up to a definite point at least. He also criticised industry for not doing more itself to aid a 
body that was likely to prove invaluable as the economy changed from a seller’s to a buyer’s 
market in which skilled salesmanship would be a necessary requirement.
44
 Cripps has often 
been portrayed as the embodiment of austerity, but this is to simplify. Indeed, this was the 
label that was attached to him at the time by Lord Woolton, chairman of the Conservative 
Party, who used it as a weapon. Cripps may have been against the New Look and the 
Housewives’ League, certainly, but he also dressed smartly and indulged a taste for good 
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cigars, as well as using advertisers’ expertise when he believed it to be in the national 
interest.
45
 Significantly enough, Woolton, who as Minister of Food had been responsible for 
rationing during the war, was awarded the Publicity Club Cup for services to advertising in 
1947.
46
 
 The desire to co-operate and conciliate led advertisers to stress repeatedly the 
importance of putting their own house in order. The advertising press was keen to curb the 
worst excesses of the industry and promote ‘ethical’ advertising, remoralise their practice 
and reassert their professional status, in order to educate the public that advertising was 
honest as well as indispensable for economic growth. There was much talk of the urgent 
need to ‘restore faith in advertising’ and ‘rehabilitate’ the industry as we have noted. This 
necessarily involved a good deal of soul searching and owning up to past mistakes. The 
editor of Advertiser’s Weekly emphasised that exaggerated claims in copy, craftily worded 
sales agreements and the practice of pushing inferior goods had now to be avoided, 
remarking that ‘the stunts of the “foolish thirties”’ had lost them much public good will and 
that there was ‘growing consciousness of the consumer that advertising was not always 
honest.’
46
 In similar vein, the advertising manager of The Times, W. R. Balch, observed that 
people had learnt to make do with substitutes during the war and needed re-educating 
about brands, but admitted that this would not be easy as people had gone through a 
period of ‘discipline and training’ in both the armed forces and industry that they would not 
have experienced in peacetime, and as a result they were ‘critical of private enterprise, and 
not easily to be persuaded. How to appeal to this new public was the question they had to 
face.’ The best solution, Balch maintained – and many agreed with him – was that 
advertisers had to clean up their act and only publicise good value, honest commodities.
47
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 Some Labour Party MPs were more sympathetic to advertisers and these were 
wooed assiduously. Gilbert McAllister, who had stood against Jennie Lee in North Lanark in 
the 1935 general election and had been elected MP for Rutherglen in 1945, addressed the 
Publicity Club of London in March 1946. In his address to this body, McAllister argued that 
‘publicity’ was ‘a great educational force’ that ought to be used to trumpet the superiority 
of ‘the democratic way of life’ over totalitarianism, which at present used publicity to 
greater advantage: ‘In road-making and house-building before the war we were far ahead of 
any other country, yet the totalitarian regimes, by doing a better job of publicity, had “sold” 
to the world fairy tales about supermen working wonders, when in reality this country was 
achieving greater things.’ This theme became more important as the Cold War developed as 
we shall see later.
48
 Another friend of the industry, the emollient Minister for Town and 
Country Planning, Lewis Silkin, addressed the Incorporated Society of British Advertisers on 
the subject of outdoor advertising later that year and urged its members to make their 
posters more tasteful and unobtrusive. However, Silkin was keen to reassure the audience 
that he supported advertising generally and distanced himself from hostile critics who now 
seemed to be in the ascendent, though he also stressed that the countryside and the new 
towns could not be allowed to be defaced.
49
 There was a good deal of communication 
between Silkin and the industry before and after the passage of the Town and Country 
Planning Act in 1947, which tightened up the law considerably but which fell short of 
realising advertisers’ worst fears, despite continued pressure from bodies like the BBC and 
the Council for the Preservation of Rural England.
50
 
 
Crisis 
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An Advertising Convention was held at Margate in May 1947, the first for eight years, on the 
theme of ‘Advertising: A Vital Stimulus to National Recovery.’ Welcoming plans for the 
Convention, the editor of Advertiser’s Weekly reminded readers: 
 The Margate Convention will face a new world with a new set of problems. The 
country has been ravaged by a world war. A Government critical of private 
enterprise is in power. Advertising is under heavy attack from many quarters, official, 
professional, and political. The whole climate of the country has changed towards 
our profession, not without reason. For seven years every form of advertising has 
been painfully restricted in volume, and therefore in vigour and attack. A generation 
has grown up which has no memory of advertising operating with the full range of its 
powers.
51
 
The editor hoped that the industry would use the opportunity afforded by the Convention 
to ‘put advertising back in its proper place’ by demonstrating to government that it was not 
resolutely opposed to planning but rather had a vital role to play in national economic 
reconstruction. The Advertising Association that organised the Convention had approached 
Cripps, asking for his seal of approval and inviting him to address delegates. Cripps refused 
to attend, much to the disgust of the editor of Advertiser’s Weekly, who remarked that the 
President of the Board of Trade had merely given the event ‘a condescending pat on the 
head, and passed on.’
52
 
 It fell to Glenvil Hall, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, to represent the 
Government at the Convention, which attracted between 500 and 600 advertising people. In 
his speech to delegates, Hall joked about the event serving as a ‘curtain-raiser’ to the Labour 
Party Conference that was taking place a few weeks later (the joke fell flat), and also 
stressed that Government, which was spending about £3 million a year on advertising, 
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needed the industry’s services to help both inform and inspire the population. Replying for 
the industry, F. P. Bishop, chairman of the executive committee of the Advertising 
Association and one of the industry’s key ideologists in post-war Britain, portrayed 
advertising as incompatible with social democracy, owing to its historical roots and 
economic function. Bishop liked to take a comprehensive, philosophical view: 
 The task of advertising during the last three hundred years...had been to condition 
the consumer to the rising standard of living made possible by machine production. 
It might be that in our own day they were confronted with a change – with the 
function of conditioning people for a return to a medieval planned economy. 
Advertising was essentially involved in the system of capitalistic free enterprise 
(applause).
53
 
For Bishop, planning was by definition anti-modern and backward looking, ‘medieval’ in fact. 
Advertising on the other hand was integrally bound up with ‘free enterprise’, which had 
literally delivered the goods for consumers since the mid-seventeenth century, first in 
Britain and then in the West more generally, as agricultural and industrial capitalism had 
spread.
54
 The idea that advertising and an expanding economy went hand in hand was also 
frequently reiterated in the Advertising Association’s journal, re-launched to coincide with 
the Margate Convention. A leading article in the first number denounced government 
control of advertising that would ‘take us back to an unchanging state like that of one of the 
civilisation’s of the Orient, “half as old as time”...a certain way to poverty.’
55
 The journal’s 
editor concluded that the key object of the Convention, which had been to get government 
on side, had failed.
56
 
 One of the reasons why advertisers were so anxious about their future was that they 
were aware that Dalton had wanted to impose a punitive tax on advertisements since the 
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end of the war. Indeed, Dalton’s hostility towards advertising and consumer culture more 
generally went back much further than that; speaking at a Fabian Society conference in 
1934 he had remarked that, ‘A dictatorship of consumption was desirable...There would be 
less dislocation on the producers’ side if the caprice of consumers’ expenditure were 
controlled.’
57
 Advertisers’ worst fears were confirmed when the Chancellor announced his 
intention of introducing such a tax in the Finance Bill in November 1947. Under this scheme, 
only half rather than the full amount of a company’s expenditure on advertising (except for 
the export and trade press) would be allowed to be written off for tax purposes. Dalton 
wanted to damp down inflationary pressure by reducing demand for luxury goods and those 
in short supply or unavailable, cut out the wastage of labour power and strengthen the 
export drive. After Dalton resigned following the budget leak, his successor as Chancellor, 
Sir Stafford Cripps, continued the attack. Cripps hoped that pursuing a demand 
management strategy would solve the very serious monetary and fiscal crisis that faced the 
country; though Advertiser’s Weekly reckoned his approach was ‘more reminiscent of the 
early Fabian than of the Keynesian economics of 1947’, modern historians such as Peter 
Clarke have argued convincingly that this budget was indeed classic Keynes.
58
 Like Dalton, 
during the depression of the 1930s Cripps had believed that consumer wants should be 
subordinated under a system of government planning. He criticised the production of luxury 
goods while the majority experienced scarcity and concluded that ‘unless you can plan the 
whole consumption of a country against its whole production you never can distribute 
abundance.’
59
 However, Cripps’s position had become more contradictory by the late 1940s. 
Keen to balance the compulsions required by state planning with the individual freedom 
necessary in a democracy, for example, he sometimes expressed the hope that the Co-
operative movement would help regulate consumer demand.
60
 As Richard Toye has 
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observed, a ‘dictatorship of consumption’ was not on his agenda by this time.
61
 
Nevertheless, and despite such ambiguities, it was little wonder surely that as far as 
advertisers were concerned, the proposed tax on advertising was another sign of 
government hostility to free enterprise and the rising tide of planning, which threatened 
their very raison d’être.
62
 
 The advertising industry sent deputations to the Chancellor and the Advertising 
Association immediately launched a co-ordinated campaign against the tax in the country 
and in parliament. The association’s journal, which was not usually alarmist, portrayed the 
challenge to the industry as profoundly serious. The confrontation it argued had been 
coming for some time; pressure from government had been mounting since the end of the 
war, with the ban on goodwill advertising being rigorously enforced more than it had been 
in the past. The editor of the journal referred to the refusal by the Ministry of Food in 
January 1946 to allow advertising as an item of cost by a manufacturer of a famous branded 
product. The Town and Country Planning Act, which would seriously curtail outdoor 
advertising, was seen as another aspect of a wider assault. Careful not to blame Cripps 
personally whose motives were accepted as genuine, the journal nevertheless accused his 
supporters of having ‘ulterior motives’, for many of them ‘regard both Advertising and the 
Press as fair game for their political spleen. Advertising is just another part of capitalism that 
can be struck down.’ The ultimate threat facing the industry was no less than ‘direct control 
of advertisement, both as to volume and character, for and on behalf of the Government.’
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The industry’s spokesmen pointed to critics like Kingsley Martin at the New Statesman, who 
was greatly alarmed by the economic waste represented by ‘de-concentration’ and the 
return of brand names to market soft drinks and petrol.
64
 However, much to advertisers’ 
relief, within less than a month Cripps indicated that he was willing to compromise, 
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accepting a voluntary plan for regulation put together by the Federation of British Industries 
and overseen by a Conservative MP, Isaac Pitman.
65
 Cripps agreed to a year’s trial of what 
he described as the ‘workmanlike’ plan in February 1948, which it was estimated would 
represent a cut of 15% for luxury and scarce goods. It covered all kinds of media – outdoor, 
press, exhibitions, films and direct mail – and 10,000 copies of the plan were distributed to 
national advertisers, agencies, retail and trade associations that were asked to sign up.
66
 
 It would be misleading to suggest that Cripps was not keen on this tax or that he 
backtracked easily, as have a number of historians.
67
 The right wing press was naturally 
delighted when the proposed tax was shelved. The Daily Express had condemned it from the 
start as an attempt by the state to re-impose the ‘taxes on knowledge’ which had been 
abolished in 1853 and underlined the case for advertising’s role in promoting economic 
growth.
68
 The Express welcomed Cripps’ decision to drop the tax and so did the Daily Mail, 
though the papers also reported the fact that Cripps had threatened to revive the tax in the 
April budget if advertisers proved reluctant to fall in line. Taunts made in the Commons by 
Oliver Stanley, MP for Bristol West, about the Chancellor having performed ‘infanticide’ on 
an ‘infant’ that was not his own incensed Cripps, who rose ‘grim-faced and white’, slapped 
the Treasury box and ‘glaring’ at Stanley exclaimed, ‘I was just as much responsible for the 
advertisement tax and as much in agreement with it as Mr Dalton.’
69
 
 Fully understanding that the Chancellor meant business, Pitman was keen to placate 
Cripps and assure him that the industry strongly supported the government at this moment 
of national crisis.
70
 And most of the industry duly signed up. By late May 1948 Pitman could 
report that a total of 196 trade associations, 3,221 individual advertisers, 298 advertising 
agencies and 375 media owners had lent their support; nearly 400 of those advertisers who 
regularly spent more than £5,000 per annum, out of a total of less than 600, had already 
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affirmed the plan.
71
 However, there were also calls for the voluntary agreement to be 
dropped as soon as the immediate crisis had passed and this pressure increased from late 
summer 1948, though Cripps insisted that the plan needed to be extended for another year, 
despite the fact that the economy picked up slightly and more consumer goods started to 
appear in the shops.
72
 By Christmas the plan was dropped, advertisers congratulating 
themselves that they had done their bit and proved their usefulness, though the struggle 
undoubtedly strengthened the belief that the industry would not be safe until Labour had 
been removed from power.
73
 Indeed from this time onwards, the necessity of a specifically 
ideological campaign against advertising’s critics was frequently urged. This was the key 
theme, for example, of the ‘Convention in print’ published in Advertiser’s Weekly in the 
summer of 1948. The line now taken was far more combative and less conciliatory than 
before, the tone shriller. W. D. C. Cormac, for example, warned that the ‘barrier of 
resistance to advertising’ encouraged by ‘so-called intellectuals’ represented, ‘the most 
dangerous menace to our livelihood which has ever existed.’
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 Advertisers mounted a staunch campaign against the threat of taxation and used a 
number of key arguments in their defence. They maintained predictably that the tax was 
practically unworkable in many respects and restricted ‘freedom of choice’ for consumers 
even more than at present.
75
 But the crisis also forced the industry’s ideologues to develop 
reasons that were rather more elevated. Most important, apologists increasingly conflated 
advertising with democracy. This line was employed before Dalton and Cripps’ assault, by 
the editor of Advertiser’s Weekly in autumn 1946, for instance, who asserted that 
advertising was the ‘Basis for Democracy’ and that if left-wing moralists and economists like 
Nicholas Kaldor got their way, ‘they will be guilty of pulling down the structure on which 
democracy, so rightly valued, is dependent’.
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 Early the following year John Nicholas in a 
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lecture to the Publicity Club of London entitled, ‘Democracy cannot be made to work 
without Advertising’, distinguished between advertising and propaganda, affinities between 
which had typically been asserted by the industry’s critics. According to Nicholas, while free 
economies and societies used the former, servile states characterised by dictatorial forms of 
state planning used the latter. He made the contrast in the most colourful, sexist language 
he could muster: 
 If democracy doesn’t use advertising, it has to use propaganda – and propaganda is 
an anonymous lying harlot, a secret and corrupt woman whose brazen and furtive 
mischief has wrecked Europe more than once. Advertising is not a branch of 
propaganda...advertising is the corrective of propaganda, the antidote, the 
prophylactic.  Advertising properly used protected the public mind against the wild 
words of the agitator, against the emotional fevers of the demagogue, against the 
subtle partisanship of the leader writer, the pamphleteer and the inspired article.
77
 
Nicolas puffed advertising as a cure-all, quite capable he believed of convincing American 
citizens of the rightness of the US loan to the British state, or Germans of the necessity of 
the Occupation, or even ‘straightening out the relations between Labour and Capital’ 
domestically. However, the context remained extremely unpropitious and the fact that the 
Labour government was now spending about £3,000,000 a year on advertising was regarded 
by many commentators as an ominous sign that it was propaganda that now had the upper 
hand in Britain, a point also frequently made by Tory leaders such as Lord Woolton, who 
called for it to be drastically curtailed.
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 The developing Cold War was a boon to those who wished to collapse together 
democracy and advertising. In an important article, Stefan Schwarzkopf has shown how 
advertising professionals capitalised on the increasing ideological polarisation that occurred 
22 
 
in the late 1940s, portraying themselves as champions of Western ideas of ‘freedom’ and 
‘consumer choice’, which they frequently elided. This was the dominant theme of the 
International Advertising Convention organised by the Advertising Association in London in 
1951, which carried the strap line, ‘The Task of Advertising in a Free World’.
79
 People like 
Nicholas and F. P. Bishop, who published two book length ripostes to critics in the 1940s, 
readily employed the emerging discourse of ‘totalitarianism’ to support their case.
80
 
Influenced by Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) they sought a loftier vision. For 
Nicholas, utilitarian arguments in support of advertising were not enough, the battle needed 
to be waged on a much higher, more spiritual, level. He asked rhetorically, ‘Of what good 
are your export and marketing campaigns...if the morals of the world’s markets is disrupted 
by communistic advertising and propaganda?’ And Nicholas went on to warn that, ‘If we 
didn’t want to fight Russia sooner or later we should have to outsell her in the ideological 
market.’
81
 For Bishop, who won Harrow for the Conservative Party in February 1950, free 
consumer choice underpinned political freedom; indeed the latter was only made possible 
by the former. Dictatorship, including an ‘economic planning commission with dictatorial 
powers’, were forms of ‘totalitarianism’ and therefore fundamentally opposed to ‘free 
enterprise’ and the lifeblood of the economic system, a free press and ‘competitive 
advertising’.
82
 Conservative politicians such as Harold Macmillan found such arguments 
highly appealing, naturally, delighting guests at a luncheon organised by the Advertising 
Association at the Savoy early in 1949 with an encomium to an industry that he asserted 
represented ‘the essential defence of individualism, of private choice, of personal taste, of 
consumers’ rights, of all the things, in a word, that distinguish a free from a servile 
economy.’
83
 Anthony Eden voiced similar sentiments when guest of honour at the dinner 
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held at the Dorchester the following year to mark the jubilee of the Institute of Practitioners 
in Advertising.
84
 
 If the Cold War emboldened the supporters of advertising, conversely it cut the 
ground from under those who wished to constrain the industry. The growth of anti-Soviet 
feeling, fuelled by most of the popular press and geo-political events, served to strengthen 
the arguments of British advertisers who had forged close relationships with their 
counterparts in the US for decades; one of the largest agencies in the country, J. Walter 
Thompson, was American owned, even if the London office enjoyed a large degree of 
autonomy.
85
 As we have noted, Cripps hoped to balance socialist planning with consumer 
freedom, but this became more and more difficult when planning of any kind could be 
convincingly portrayed as signalling the threat of communism, a homegrown variety of 
‘totalitarianism’. Announced in summer 1947, Marshall Aid represented a key moment, 
forcing people to make stark choices and splitting the left. Although the links between 
Marshall Aid and the spread of consumer culture were far from straightforward, and 
historians have rightly questioned simplistic accounts of ‘Americanization’, connections did 
exist, if not immediately then in the medium and long term.
86
 In the 1950s, forms such as 
the self-service supermarket, for instance, came to symbolise the consumer good life made 
possible by American free enterprise, and Marshall Aid helped cement this identification, 
albeit often in oblique ways; the popularity of supermarkets was encouraged by fact-finding 
tours of the US by British retailers funded through the programme.
87
 And it is not 
coincidental surely that Aneurin Bevan, who continued to declaim against advertising, was 
also a critic of Atlanticism. For his part, as Chancellor of the Exchequer struggling to deal 
with a dire financial crisis, Cripps had little alternative but to accept Marshall Aid. In a 
speech he gave in summer 1948, Cripps praised Secretary of State George Marshall for 
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having the ‘vision’ to recognise that ‘Western European democracy’ would not survive 
without American support for economic reconstruction. Cripps went on to note how the 
term ‘cold war’ was now being used to describe the struggle ‘between two very different 
conceptions of the way of life of nations’, and although he reaffirmed commitment to ‘an 
economy planned to serve the community as a whole’, he concluded by stressing that he 
‘adhere(d) firmly and unalterably to what we conceive to be the democratic way of life in 
which the individual counts as a human being, whose freedom must be preserved to think, 
act and talk as he likes.’
88
 
 
Conclusion 
It was the threat of taxation and the indignity of the voluntary plan that forced advertisers 
to take sides more openly in the increasingly polarised contest between planning and free 
enterprise in Britain in the late 1940s. For years, most ideologists of advertising had feigned 
political impartiality but this could no longer be maintained. As J. Fordham Sadler put it in a 
letter to the Journal of the Advertising Association in autumn 1948, advertisers had to come 
off the fence for if planning finally triumphed in this country, ‘there will be just as many 
opportunities for advertising men as there are in Moscow.’ The industry had to 
acknowledge the fact, Sadler continued, that ‘the future of advertising, like our very 
existence, is a political matter.’
89
 A more bullish approach was also encouraged by the 
gradual shift from a seller’s to a buyer’s market with more choice for consumers; the 
gradual easing of constraints imposed by the shortage of newsprint and the voluntary 
reduction in expenditure made prospects appear much brighter.
90
 Advertiser’s Weekly 
summarised in detail an article in the Statistical Review that appeared in January 1950, 
which reported that press advertising expenditure for 1949 had at last surpassed pre-war 
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levels, reaching over £30.5 million. Even more promising, the figure for the last quarter of 
the year was up nearly 55 per cent over the corresponding quarter for 1948 – the highest 
ever recorded for a single quarter.
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 Not surprisingly, relations between the advertising industry and government became 
more hostile. Labour Party threats to nationalise sugar refining provoked a wide scale 
campaign against nationalisation from the summer of 1949, which was funded by Tate and 
Lyle and orchestrated by Aims of Industry, a pro-free enterprise pressure group with close 
links to the Conservative Party that had been founded seven years before by business 
leaders. Packets of sugar carried a cartoon character Mr. Cube, who exhorted consumers to 
back ‘Tate not State’. Various techniques were employed to win over the public, including 
cardboard ration book holders and Mr. Cube cut-outs for children that were distributed 
through grocery stores, propaganda films, a board game and even a dance. Press 
advertisements for the ‘Sugar Consumers’ Petition’ aided the collection of over one million 
signatures. Lord Lyle, who became a director of Aims of Industry in 1950, thought the sharp 
increase in his company’s advertising expenditure money well spent and envisaged more 
would be necessary in the future.
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 It is impossible to say with any certainty what effect this anti-government advertising 
had on the result of the February 1950 general election, which saw Labour’s majority 
slashed to a mere five seats in the Commons, but it was hardly likely to have been positive. 
In private advertisers worried about the legality of such advertising or if it contravened 
existing statutes regarding election expenses; in its confidential quarterly bulletin, for 
example,  the Institute of Incorporated Practitioners in Advertising issued members careful 
advice about how to remain on the right side of the law.
93
 The situation was fluid and 
advertisers were themselves divided on whether they should line up openly on the side of 
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free enterprise, understandable given the fact that many agencies were heavily dependent 
on government contracts. An editorial in Advertiser’s Weekly that appeared a week before 
the election urged readers to take sides as ‘one cannot divorce politics from economics’ but 
also attempted to reconcile such contradictory imperatives. Doubting that a Conservative 
majority would usher in a ‘golden age of advertising’ immediately, the alternative continued 
the editor would be far worse, including the likely introduction of Consumer Advice 
Centres.
94
 The tone became much more strident after the polls. A front page article 
declared the result a decisive victory against further nationalisation, strongly implying that 
anti-nationalisation advertising had had ‘some effect on the anti-Socialist vote’, and noting 
approvingly that the campaign would continue in sugar, meat distribution, cold storage and 
cement.
95
 By the summer a decidedly combative stance had been adopted, Zimmerman 
suggesting that the Advertising Convention that was being planned for the year following 
‘should be a battle school for advertising as a militant force in the war for a free world.’
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 Though it has been largely overlooked by historians, the attack on commercial 
advertising that came to a head in 1947 represented a serious challenge to the industry. 
Ideologists of advertising interpreted it as such at the time; it convinced them that their 
industry would never be safe until a Conservative government was returned to power and 
they worked hard to bring that about. After Cripps reluctantly backed off, they waged a 
sophisticated, on-going campaign to make advertising respectable and insinuate commercial 
discourse into political as well as economic life. This was no easy task in the early 1950s. 
Heated debate preceded the introduction of commercial television in 1955, for example, 
which provoked anxieties across the political spectrum.
97
 However, the attack on advertising 
from the labour movement now lacked its earlier focus as part of a more sustained critique 
of capitalism. When the literary intellectual Richard Hoggart declaimed against the industry 
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towards the end of the decade, he employed liberal Leavisite arguments, along with the 
snobbishness they entailed. More radical critics that came to identify with the New Left 
looked instead to Frankfurt School Marxism for inspiration, although Raymond Williams’ 
insightful essay on the subject borrowed heavily from Thompson’s Voice of Civilisation, not 
least by insisting against those who claimed that advertising was as old as civilisation itself 
that modern advertising was actually a quite recent development, closely bound up with the 
growth of monopoly capitalism from the late nineteenth century.
98
 But the case against 
commercial advertising failed to resonate widely in newly ‘affluent’ Britain and was no 
longer mainstream in the labour movement, as it had been during and immediately after 
the war against fascism. 
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